Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter investments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based approach to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing price floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm has the opportunity to switch from a highcarbon "dirty" technology to a low-carbon "clean" technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real market data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We find that a carbon price floor can be used to induce earlier low-carbon technology investment and show this result to be robust to a large variety of input parameter settings.
Introduction
In the context of reducing long-term carbon price uncertainty stemming from ambiguous climate change policy, some contributions in the academic literature have suggested several forms of regulatory price management, mainly in the form of a price cap or safety valve (Pizer 2002; Jacoby and Ellerman 2004; Szolgayová et al. 2008) . 1 If realized abatement costs turn out to be higher than expected (i.e. the emission cap is too low) the price cap serves as a ceiling on the carbon price and emitters can buy additional permits at the specified price 2 . McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) , Helm (2008) , Burtraw et al. (2010 ), Fell and Morgenstern (2009 ), and Philibert (2009 extend this discussion by analyzing a "symmetric safety valve", also referred to as a price collar. This approach not only insures emitters against higher than expected costs, but also sets a minimum carbon price, thereby bounding compliance costs downward. Experience from the EU ETS, the world's largest multi-national carbon trading scheme, provides evidence for the thought that an overestimation of the required permit volume might be a more realistic scenario than an underestimation. Therefore, a price floor might be a more critical design element within a given price range than a cap.
A price floor reduces uncertainty over future profitability by guaranteeing a minimum rate of return to an investor or firm pondering an investment decision. This argument is particularly important in the energy sector, which is characterized by capital-intensive and longlived power plants. In this sense a minimum carbon price creates incentives to invest in new technologies over and above those already induced by the (unmanaged) market price. Abatement will still take place if the costs of CO 2 -reductions are lower than the price of allowances, since profit-maximizing firms will implement the emissions reductions and sell the surplus allowances. A second argument in favor of the implementation of a price floor is the possibility that it would limit the volatility of carbon market prices (cp. Grüll and 4 Taschini 2011). 3 In times of growing volatility in fuel prices this fact would favor renewable energy.
An intensive academic discussion about such a downside insurance in carbon markets started only recently with the work of Wood and Jotzo (2011) . This is surprising given that the concept of a price floor has already found its way into legislation in the United Kingdom price of the EU ETS -which the UK is a member of -to a national target level. Since other countries under the EU ETS do not have a similar price floor, this measure will increase abatement costs in the UK relative to other EU countries. UK legislators justify this higher burden by arguing that regulatory uncertainty about future carbon prices may undermine long-term price signals and incentives and that the carbon price from the EU ETS might not be strong and stable enough to stimulate sufficient investments in low-carbon technologies. 4 The Commission implicitly agrees to this diagnosis when stating that, in order to boost low-carbon technologies, " […] appropriate measures need to be considered, including revisiting the agreed linear reduction of the ETS cap" (European Commission 2011). In this sense an additional goal evolves from a cap-and-trade system: it could be used to promote technological innovation to a greater extent than automatically induced by the long-term price signals from the market.
Taking this logic as our starting point, we contribute to this debate about price management in the form of a floor price in the carbon market. Setting aside organizational questions concerning the implementation of the floor (for these we refer to Wood and Jotzo 2011) we focus on how investment decisions in the electric power sector are affected by 5 the introduction of a permit price floor. We employ a real options-based model of an individual electricity producer who currently operates a "dirty" power generation technology, which we define as a technology that has considerably higher CO 2 emissions per production unit than alternative technologies. This implies that the firm has comparatively large compliance costs. The company furthermore faces an investment decision which would permit it to switch to a "clean" generation technology, i.e. a technology with low emissions per production unit. By simulating sets of cash flow paths as functions of technology specific costs related to operation, fuel and carbon emissions, we show that a regulatory intervention in the form of a price management mechanism in the CO 2 -market influences the optimal timing of the investment decision of this company.
In particular, we demonstrate that the introduction of a price floor can lead to an earlier adoption of low-carbon technologies. In this case, the CO 2 -market can be considered to act as an instrument for technology policy.
The methodology we apply is similar to that used in several contributions dealing with investment decisions in the power sector under different dimensions of uncertainties. Comparable studies, among others, are Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) , Fuss et al. (2008) , Szolgayová et al. (2008) , Yang et al. (2008) , Fuss et al. (2009), Fuss and Szolgayová (2010) , Chen and Tseng (2011) , Kettunen et al. (2011) and Zhu and Fan (2011) . However, none of the aforementioned contributions evaluate the influence of a carbon price floor on the investment decision in general and on the timing of the technology switch specifically.
The only study employing, at least in passing, a price floor in a quantitative model is Abadie et al. (2011) . In contrast to their work, we do not only perform a detailed analysis of a constant floor price level but investigate two different designs of the floor. In particular, we perform in-depth investigations of a price floor mechanism with constant and with linearly increasing minimum prices. In addition, we endogenously compute the floor price necessary to trigger abandonment of the "dirty" technology at an earlier time. Finally, we perform 6 a number of robustness checks using a large variety of different input parameter settings. 
The model
We model a single power generating firm which is a price taker in all markets and supplies electricity inelastically. The firm has to comply with an emissions trading system by obtaining emissions permits covering its production needs. We assume it to buy and redeem the necessary carbon certificates at the end of each period. This ensures that the company never holds any surplus certificates which it would wish to sell back to the market.
Structure of the decision problem
The firm currently operates a "dirty" technology ( ) power plant with a remaining life of . This technology is characterized by high emissions per production unit, causing the firm to face high costs of compliance with the emissions trading system. 5 The company has to make a decision about replacing the currently operating power plant before the end of its economic life. In particular, the firm can choose one of three courses of action at the beginning of each period, modeled in discrete time: (i) discontinuing business, (ii) replacing the existing power plant with a new power plant using the same technology , or (iii) replacing the existing power plant with a new power plant using a "clean" technology ( ), which is characterized by low emissions per production unit. 6 If the firm chooses option (i), we assume that the disinvestment is associated with costs Our question concerning the introduction of a price floor in the carbon market is threefold:
firstly, we are interested in whether the existing plant gets replaced or not. If this is the case, we secondly investigate which technology is chosen. Thirdly, we want to determine at which point in time -if ever -the "dirty" plant is optimally replaced by the "clean" one.
We illustrate the time structure of the model in Figure 1 . 
Stochastic price processes
We assume the CO 2 price , the price the firm receives for selling electricity , and its technology specific variable costs (operating, maintenance and fuel costs) to follow a multi-dimensional Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as in Szolgayová et al. (2008) and Yang et al. (2008) . 9 The four processes are modeled as having two components each -an expected drift and a random walk:
where ( ) , ( ) and ( ) is the diagonal matrix formed with the elements of as its principal diagonal. The vector ( ) contains the expected continuously compounded growth
Start of price processes rates of the variables in ( ).
is a 4-dimensional Wiener process consisting of onedimensional component Wiener processes correlated according to matrix :
Each realization of these processes is discretized, departs from a fixed value at time , and is being simulated for the entire model horizon . We assume the individual processes to be uncorrelated (i.e. to be the identity matrix) in the larger part of the subsequent analysis, but report results obtained with correlated processes in section A.3 of the appendix.
Dynamic programming
Our derivation of the optimal decision in this context is loosely based on the approach of Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) , which brings together backward oriented dynamic programming techniques and forward oriented simulation techniques, yielding a versatile procedure which allows for handling multivariate state variables (see Gamba and Fusari 2009 ). The key insight of Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) was that the conditional value (expectation) of future payments can be estimated from the cross-sectional information in the simulation by using a least squares approach.
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Our optimization procedure starts with a Monte Carlo simulation, which is used to generate paths for the relevant state variables ( ( ) ). Based on these simulated paths, the dynamic programming algorithm compares the expected outcome of investing in a new technology plant with delaying the investment decision for one more period, and with the possibility of exiting the business immediately. Note that, in our solution algorithm, we do not allow for reinvestment in technology at any time . Given a positive discount rate, such a strategy would always be suboptimal, since a new plant of 10 technology generates the same cash flows as the existing plant, yet requires payment of the investment cost. For this reason, if an optimal solution entails reinvesting in technology , this decision can only be made at . We therefore do not consider premature reinvestment in in our numerical solution algorithm.
The optimal exercise decision at any point in time is obtained as the maximum of the immediate investment net present value, the estimated net present value from delaying the decision, and zero in case of disinvestment. Since the estimated continuation value depends on future outcomes, the procedure must work backwards from the latest ( ) to the earliest possible investment time ( ) (Cortazar et al. 2008) . Following this procedure we obtain, for each path, the optimal decision. This can be to discontinue business at Operationally, the procedures of the dynamic programming approach differ between time and any . The following sections provide the algorithm we follow to solve the dynamic programming problem.
Determination of the decision at
We start by calculating the net present value of a plant investment at for each simulated path [ ]:
where ( ) denotes the discount factor applied at time to cash flows occurring at time . The cash flow is defined as:
where is the revenue (calculated as the electricity output in MWh times the price for electricity ) at time on the simulated path , are the variable costs (calculated as the electricity output in MWh times the technology dependent variable cost factor) for each of the two technologies, are the carbon costs (calculated as the technology dependent CO 2 output in tons times the price of carbon certificates ), ⁄ is the depreciation of the power plant, and is the corporate tax rate.
In order to maintain comparability, irrespective of the specific time at which the clean investment is realized, we consistently evaluate all investment programs over our model horizon of periods. Equation (3) rests on the simplifying assumption that the plant will be sold for its remaining book value at the end of this time. 12 The net present value from equation (3) Because present values coming from simulated cash flow paths are random variables, we need to form an expectation of these values. We achieve this by regressing the net present values obtained under (3) on a linear combination of a set of basis functions of the simulated state variables at time , using a simple least-squares specification (Gamba and Fusari 2009 and Longstaff and Schwartz 2001) :
where is a constant, the are regression coefficients, is the carbon price at time on the simulated path , and is a white random error term. We then use the estimated regression parameters to calculate an estimator for the conditional net present value ̂ ( ) for each simulated path at time .
In the next step, we decide between exiting the business, reinvesting in technology , and investing in technology . We thus obtain the following net present value estimate assuming optimal investment behavior:
The conditional net present value estimate obtained in the previous section forms the basis for the analysis at . Here we distinguish between the treatment of the case where (i) we invest in the clean technology and (ii) we continue production using the dirty technology.
In case (i), we again calculate each path's net present value of investing in the clean technology using equation (3) . We then use these to estimate the regression according to equation (4) and calculate the vector of net present value estimates when investing in the clean technology to obtain ̂ ( ), as illustrated in section 2.3.1.
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For case (ii) we use the values obtained from equation (5) for , add the cash flow for period and calculate the discounted net present value estimate assuming that we continue operating the existing technology plant:
In the next step, we estimate the following regression for :
We then calculate the estimated net present value for each simulated path at time using the net present values estimates from with the coefficient estimates obtained from equation (7) to obtain the estimated net present values ̂ ( ). Finally, we obtain the net present value estimates assuming optimal investment behavior at by applying equation (5). The arguments of the maximum function in (5) now are the net present value estimates from cases (i) and (ii), and zero.
By repeating the steps undertaken for for all other times { }, we derive the net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior for the entire investment decision horizon. The result along each simulation path then is the time of the (temporally) first case where the decision is other than to continue operating the dirty technology plant. In other words, starting at time and progressing forward through time,
we record for each path the earliest point in time where the optimal decision is to either invest into technology or to exit the business altogether. 
Numerical Results
This section presents results from calculations using our methodology. While the procedures can be applied to any decision regarding the timing of the switch to a low-emissions technology, for our numerical examples we compare a coal fired "dirty" plant to a hydro powered "clean" plant. analysis. The discount rate is chosen to be . Finally, we assume linear depreciation and a corporate tax rate of 50%.
Completing our basic parameter setting, we arbitrarily assume the revenues and the unit costs to have expected growth rates and standard deviations of 1%, with one exception.
The unit cost process of the coal plant is modeled as having a standard deviation of because this cost factor contains the effect of relatively volatile coal prices. The price process of CO 2 emission allowances is furthermore assumed to have an expected growth rate of . This rate can be derived by determining the continuously compounded growth rate necessary to achieve a carbon price appreciation from 14.32 EUR We set our total model horizon to be 40 years in correspondence to our previously mentioned time window stretching from 2010 to 2050. We then run 10000 simulations for all stochastic components and derive an optimal point in time for replacing technology with by applying the algorithm as described in section 2.3. 
An illustrative example
For the ease of understanding of our methodology, we present a brief numerical example in this section. We simulate ten 40-period paths each of , , and , with all parameters taken from above except for the carbon price standard deviation, which is set to 10% to improve clarity. Figure 2 plots the ten example cash flow time series for technology and plants resulting from these simulations: Due to our use of a CO 2 allowance price drift rate of , the cash flows coming from technology turn negative very quickly. The ones from are less exposed to the impact of high carbon prices and thus exhibit a positive slope, resulting in positive .
Note that hardly any "dirty" cash flow path exhibits an greater than the corresponding "clean" one. For this reason -and for this example only -we restrict all subsequent calculations for time to the technology cash flows. The individual "clean" and the estimates from the ten simulated paths in our regression approach, respectively, At this stage, standard discounted cash flow analysis would yield a recommendation for immediate investment since all estimated are positive. However, it may be a superior strategy to delay the investment to the point in time which has so far been identified to be optimal, namely . The corresponding estimates of the next period's optimal decision are therefore the estimates presented in Table 4 .
The decision between an immediate investment and a deferment now requires a reference value, which can be obtained from equation (6) . For each path, we then again use all available state variables as independent variables and the estimates stemming from the following period's optimal behavior plus the cash flow from technology for the current period as the dependent variable (equation (7)). Note that contrary to the regression at , at all earlier points in time we use both the and cost values in the regression, 18 since there is also the possibility of a further deferment in the period after the next. This implies possible dependencies of next period's estimated optimal on the current cost level of the existing ( ) plant. The estimated continuation values are greater than the estimated payoffs from an immediate investment in paths { }, which makes it the optimal decision at in these paths to defer the investment into . Moreover these results cause the vector of updated estimated optimal at , , to equal ̂ ( ) for these paths, and to equal ̂ ( ) for the remaining paths. Hence, for the next step of our methodology at , this information is used to determine .
Continuing like this until yields a vector of optimal switching times for all simulated price paths. This allows us to draw a simulation-based inference regarding the optimal time at which technology should be realized.
Results without a CO 2 emission price floor
We start the analysis proper by determining the optimal time for the replacement of technology with in the case where the price of CO 2 emission allowances is not regulated. Table 5 : Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time . The optimal strategy results in technology being replaced by in 9064 paths; in all other cases reinvestment in is found to be optimal.
In the overwhelming majority of paths we find the optimal strategy to consist of investing in a plant at , with a significant fraction of all paths ending in reinvestment in a technology plant. In the case of no CO 2 price regulation, simulations thus essentially suggest the end of the investment decision horizon as the optimal time to switch from technology to -if ever. 
Results with a CO 2 emission price floor
In this section we examine the effect on the distribution of optimal replacement times of introducing a minimum price for CO 2 emission allowances, set by regulatory institutions. As noted in section 2.2, the price floor is implemented by having the CO 2 price follow a GBM. However, if the market price trajectory falls below , the price used for the cost calculations is instead set to until the GBM appreciates again to a price higher than . Setting equal to 30 EUR/ton yields the data depicted in Table 6 . It displays, for each point in time { }, the number of simulations yielding this time as the optimal investment date. 
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We interpret these results as evidence of a relatively sensitive relation between and . Apparently, does not shift smoothly from the future to earlier points in time as increases. Instead, there seems to be a critical level of at which shifts quickly from the latest to the earliest possible investment date. In our setup, we find the level of which shifts the majority of optimal switching times from to to be around 43.30 EUR/ton. In reality it seems unlikely that any regulator will be able to directly implement a minimum price of triple the current market price. For this reason we analyze the effects of a different price floor mechanism. In this second approach, we set the starting floor price to a value close to the current market price and increase it by an increment in every period thereafter. 20 If the initial minimum price is for example set to 15 EUR/ton and the increment is chosen to be EUR/ton, the next period's minimum CO 2 prices will be 16 EUR/ton, then 17 EUR/ton and so on. Contrary to a fixed level of this approach does not result in a distribution of optimal switching times peaking at or , but rather concentrates the optimal switching decision at a time in the interior of Table 8 : Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time when EUR/ton and { }. The higher the increment, the earlier the replacement investment comes to be realized.
Our results indicate that it is necessary that EUR per year for the mode of optimal switching times to occur earlier than at . The fraction of cases where reinvestment into technology is optimal is zero for all except M=1 (24).
22 Figure 4 presents the fraction of optimal switching times for different when is set to 3 EUR/ton. If a minimum price for CO 2 is combined with a constant annual increase of this minimum price, optimal switching times are -over large parts of the parameter spacedominated by two points in time, namely and . However, when falls in the interval between approximately 16 and 27 EUR/ton, other points in time can be observed to exhibit peaks and thus constitute the predominant times at which the clean plant should be built. 
Discussion and Robustness Checks
As pointed out in the preceding section, the choice of input parameters is crucial for the results regarding the optimal switching time . Some of our parameter settings result in very different optimal switching times for only slightly modified parameters. For this reason, we now assess the robustness of our results by running simulations with a large set of parameter setting variations. Our main interest lies in the effects of changes in  the initial minimum CO 2 price 23  the increment  the drift rate , and  the diffusion rate of the CO 2 price process, as well as  the discount rate .
More precisely, we jointly vary our parameters over the following values:
All other parameters are held constant, because they only concern revenues and technology related costs and lifetimes and are thus considered to be relatively reliable. Section A.1 in the appendix contains summary results for the parameter settings analyzed. Our findings suggest the existence of a clear pattern: For each combination of the discount, the drift and the diffusion rates there exists a pair of and which moves the optimal time for replacing technology with from to . This provides a clear argument for CO 2 price policy in the form of a price floor.
We also conduct a ceteris paribus analysis for the parameters listed above, which is reported in detail in section A.2 in the appendix. The most striking result we find is that is the most frequent result for the optimal switching time irrespective of the volatility of the CO 2 price process chosen.
Departing from our default values, we also analyze the impact of introducing non-zero correlations between the four stochastic processes. Section A.3 shows that our results are robust to this variation. Finally, we test a linear instead of quadratic specification of our regression model and obtain largely unchanged results, which are reported in section A.4.
Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the effects of downward limited stochastic CO 2 -prices on the investment decision of a profit maximizing energy producer. We apply an approach derived 24 from real-option valuation and demonstrate that a CO 2 price floor can be used to induce emitters to accelerate their investments in low-carbon technologies. Since the decarbonization of the power sector, which accounts for a substantial proportion of total greenhouse gas emissions, is a conditio sine qua non for achieving lower emission targets, we choose this industry for our analysis. The key argument lies in the fact that the decision to invest in low-carbon generation technologies immediately may be superior to continuing to operate a high-carbon technology, especially in high permit price regimes. This decision is made by comparing the expected net present value of an immediate clean investment to that resulting from the deferment of an investment. Our results identify the appropriate level of a constant minimum CO 2 -price in our setting -implying an immediate "clean" investmentto fluctuate between 40 and 45 Euros per ton. An alternative solution is to introduce a fixed initial minimum price with a growth rate regime, as it is currently being implemented in the UK (HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs 2010). Simulations reveal that under this approach, the starting CO 2 price floor can be considerably lower, with its optimal levelunsurprisingly -depending on the growth rate.
However, our results turn out to be relatively sensitive with respect to the model inputs. We perform extensive robustness checks and find patterns in the distribution of optimal switching times which enable us to derive robust findings. In particular, some parameter settings balance the optimal investment timing somewhere in the interior of the investment decision horizon. We use this observation to clearly identify the impacts of changes in the CO 2 price floor, its growth rate, the drift and diffusion of the CO 2 price process and the discount rate.
We thus demonstrate that the carbon market not only helps the regulator to meet emission targets in an allocationally efficient way, but can also be used as an instrument to stimulate the adoption of low-carbon technologies. Several political proposals (e.g. in Australia, the UK and US) in the recent past support this view of the carbon market. Meanwhile it seems to have become apparent that a permit trading system will not suffice as the sole driver in 25 reaching the target of a decarbonized economy. A mixture of policy instruments appears instead to be necessary to stabilize our climate. A carbon price floor is one such instrument which is able to enhance the role of an emissions trading system in this process.
into the model. With regard to the type of process specifications to use, we consider models including regime switches and jumps in the price paths to be particularly promising candidates for future work. They have attained increased relevance in light of the recent discussion about the use of nuclear power and alternative technologies, as well as the large impact of environmental policy decisions, both of which carry the potential to instantly and strongly affect the circumstances on carbon markets. 10 The instrument modeled by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) , an American Call option, has the characteristics that (i) the underlying does not pay any dividends, and (ii) there are only two alternative courses of action at each node -to exercise or not to exercise. In our example, the investments generate cash flows in every period and we face the three-fold decision problem of continuing production with the current technology, investing in the new technology, or exiting the business altogether.
11 Note that an approach using a binomial tree would be less complex and would allow for a better identification of the optimal business strategy the firm should be counseled to adopt. We nonetheless opt for the computationally more complex backward dynamic programming approach paired with Monte Carlo simulation.
The first reason is that it enables us to model a more complex stochastic model than easily feasible using a binomial tree (i.e. stochastic processes for the carbon price, the electricity price and the two technologydependent cost factors). The second reason is that -once implemented -our approach can easily be modified to allow for future expansions of the model to include e.g. more stochastic risk factors with interdependencies of many types.
12 Note that in section 3 we choose to be sufficiently long that alternative treatments of the residual plant value have a negligible impact on the optimal decision.
13 Note that we do not report detailed results for the case where the firm decides to reinvest in technology .
This decision is, if ever, only taken at , after a decision at not to invest in a new technology plant. This case is of limited interest to our analysis since we focus on the question of whether and when investment in takes place.
14 The parameter estimates from the quadratic regression as outlined in section 2.3 yield
15 The corresponding estimated regression parameters are: ̂ ̂ ̂ ̂ ̂ ̂ ̂ . Due to the very low number of simulation paths, the signs of these estimates partly appear counterintuitive. However, with our standard number of 10000 state variable paths, the parameter of the linear revenue term exhibits a positive, and all linear cost related factors negative 29 signs. The signs of the quadratic term parameters are more difficult to interpret, yet this is of limited importance since these terms are included only as controls for non-linear dependencies. 16 The regression yields the following parameter estimates:
In the case of ( Figure A1 ), low drift rates and high diffusion rates yield later optimal switching times, while is more often found to be the optimal time to switch from technology to if the drift rate is high and the diffusion rate of the CO 2 price process is low. As Figures A2 and A3 show, shifts to later points in time with increases in the discount rate. If we increase the latter to 0.07, almost all parameter settings result in a deferment of the investment into technology to the end of the investment decision horizon at (with the exception of those cases where and are relatively high). A comparison of the two panels of Figure A .4 provides an interesting lesson for economic policy making. It suggests that it may be more profitable to introduce a steeper growth trajectory in the carbon price floor than to attempt to achieve higher carbon prices by reducing the number of emission allowances issued.
Note that this implication certainly depends on the specific parameters chosen.
Nonetheless, since the company tends to switch very late even with very high drift rates of the carbon price, we believe it unlikely that this result can be reversed through reasonable changes in the other parameters. To conclude the ceteris paribus analysis, we observe that the discount rate plays a prominent role in the timing of the investment decision. As the right panel of Figure A .5 shows, a low discount rate promotes an earlier investment into technology . Furthermore, a high discount rate does not only lead to a postponement of clean investments, it also increases the fraction of cases 36 where it is optimal to reinvest in technology . This reflects the economic intuition that higher discount rates lead to an underweighting of future savings from lower carbon emission costs compared to present costs and investment outlays.
The investment timing decision thus to a large degree depends on the capital costs of the firm. 
A.3. Correlation analysis
In an additional robustness check, we depart from the assumption of no correlation between our state variables and . We tackle this point by introducing a correlation matrix of the form:
( )
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For this matrix we assume that revenues are positively linked to costs, since any power producer will try to pass increased costs on to consumers. We furthermore assume a negative correlation between the carbon price and the unit costs of technology , since a move away from coal by large parts of the power producing industry can be expected to lower the demand for -and thus the price of -coal. The resulting effects are plotted as the difference in the fractions of optimal switching times between a simulation using uncorrelated state variables and one employing correlated state variables. 
